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OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS TIME
PREFERENCE
EVANGELOS V. DIOIKITOPOULOS
Brunel University London
SARANTIS KALYVITIS
Athens University of Economics and Business
Abstract
This paper studies the role of Ramsey taxation under the
assumption that the individual rate of time preference is
determined by the publicly provided social level of edu-
cation. We show how intertemporal complementarities of
aggregate human capital can generate multiple equilibria
and we examine the role of endogenous fiscal policies in
equilibrium selection. Our analysis implies a lower optimal
government size due to the effect of human capital on time
preference.
1. Introduction
In his seminal work, Ramsey (1927) took into account agents’ equilibrium
reactions in forming optimal fiscal policy. This second-best approach has
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been extensively revitalized in capital accumulation models of unique equi-
librium and exogenous time preference (Lucas and Stokey 1983, Judd 1985,
Chamley 1986, Lucas 1990, Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi 1993). The present
paper introduces the role of Ramsey taxation in selecting a second-best
allocation under the presence of multiple competitive equilibria generated
by intertemporal complementarities of human capital in the formation of
time preference. Our theoretical framework provides a new role for the
conduct of optimal fiscal policy under indeterminacies and poverty traps
(Ben-Gad 2003, Park and Philippopoulos 2004, Park 2009, Age´nor 2010).
We also analyze some interesting policy implications as the standard produc-
tive effects of optimal taxation are altered (Barro 1990, Futagami, Morita,
and Shibata 1993, Glomm and Ravikumar 1997, Turnovsky 2000).
The starting point of our analysis is an endogenous growth model in
which the rate of time preference depends positively on the economy-wide
consumption level and negatively on the publicly provided aggregate human
capital stock, which are exogenous to the agents’ decisions, and we introduce
in this setup optimal fiscal policy in the form of Ramsey taxation.1 We first
examine the properties of the intertemporal competitive equilibrium and
we show that there can be one or two balanced growth paths (BGPs). The
central mechanism that drives these results arises from two counterbalancing
channels. First, a rise in human capital financed by an increase in the tax
rate lowers the rate of time preference, causing savings to increase and as
a result the economy can attain higher growth. This, in turn, increases the
tax base, raises public expenditures on education, and hence fuels further
growth. On the other hand, the rise in taxation decreases private savings,
which increases the rate of time preference in the economy due to the rise
in aggregate consumption and hence lowers growth. A lower growth rate, in
turn, lowers the tax base that finances aggregate human capital formation
leading to even higher time discounting. We show that these externalities
are crucial for the steady state and the dynamics of the economy, and we
establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique or
multiple (two) BGPs.
The selection of a second-best allocation is then addressed by endoge-
nizing fiscal policy in the context of Ramsey taxation. We demonstrate, first,
how the government’s objective can determine the available set of policy
instruments (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) and, second, its importance in
the implementation of additional restrictions on private decisions that can
lead the decentralized economy to a unique BGP. Typically, global and
local indeterminacy at the competitive equilibrium implies that the ra-
tional expectations equilibria involve random variables, which are unre-
lated to the economy’s fundamentals and are driven by individual beliefs.
However, in a second-best (Stackelberg) environment, the government can
1 See Section 2 for a detailed review on these assumptions.
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obtain information through the agents’ reaction function and consequently
impose additional restrictions on the tax rate and the endowment allocation
through commitment, in order to drive the economy to a unique second-best
allocation. This policy is feasible under a state-dependent taxation rule that
is linked to aggregate endowments and internalizes intertemporal comple-
mentarities of human capital, which fuel multiplicity of intertemporal com-
petitive equilibria.
Some fiscal aspects of our work should be stressed in comparison with
the existing literature. First, a connection can be established to earlier studies
that have investigated, using models in which externalities generate multiple
growth paths, the role of public policy in eliminating the poverty trap and se-
lecting the desired competitive equilibrium (Matsuyama 1991, Boldrin 1992,
Rodrik 1996).2 However, these studies have examined how government in-
tervention operates under exogenous taxation, without explicitly specifying
the government’s objective. Endogenizing government policy becomes an in-
teresting task because the tax rate depends on the actions by private agents,
which can create rather than eliminate coordination failures and strategic
uncertainty, thus triggering the existence of multiple equilibria (Cooper
1999). In particular, in Park and Philippopoulos (2004) and Park (2009),
multiple competitive equilibria with productive public services are the out-
come of endogenous policy indeterminacy in the form of multiple tax rates.
In an overlapping generations (OLG) endogenous growth model, Glomm
and Ravikumar (1995) show that there may be multiple equilibrium paths
when public policy, in the form of public education, is endogenous. Further-
more, Ben-Gad (2003) has shown that a sufficient degree of capital taxation
in a Lucas–Uzawa endogenous growth model or a combination of factor tax-
ation and external effects can trigger indeterminacy in the form of many
(more than two) BGPs. In comparison to these studies, multiplicity can arise
here for any feasible range of exogenously set tax rate, whereas endogenous
Ramsey taxation is not only determinate (unique tax rate) but can also lead
the market economy to the desired growth regime under a state-depended
taxation rule. Regarding public policy and endogenous time preference, in
related work (Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis 2010), we have examined the role
2 Although indeterminacies have widely been studied in the literature, far less is known
on mechanisms in directing the economy toward a desired equilibrium. In models with
a continuum of equilibria arising from the presence of animal spirits, learning can act
as a selection device for choosing the rational expectations equilibrium that we can ex-
pect to observe in practice (Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer 1998, Evans and Honkapohja
1999). Ennis and Keister (2005) have presented a framework in which search frictions
create a coordination problem that generates multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and show
how the desired equilibrium can be chosen using a selection mechanism based on risk
dominance. Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007) analyze multiplicity in a model with
heterogeneous agents and intertemporal complementarities between dated debt limits,
which exhibits two Pareto-ranked equilibria, and show how active monetary policy can
force the economy onto the optimal path.
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of public capital and taxation through the endogeneity of time preference
under a (static) growth-maximizing objective within a unique competitive
equilibrium. By contrast, our generalized framework generates here multiple
competitive equilibria and we are able to analyze the selection mechanism of
the second-best allocation in the (dynamic) optimal Ramsey taxation setup.
Second, other studies have also examined the possibility of equilibrium
indeterminacy with endogenous time preference. Drugeon (1996) has stud-
ied the possibility of multiple steady states when impatience depends on indi-
vidual consumption and allows for increasing returns when both individual
and aggregate capital stock enter the production function. In our model,
multiplicity stems from the externalities generated by the effects of aggre-
gate consumption and aggregate human capital on time preference, whereas
we allow for constant returns in production through the productive role of
human capital. Chen (2007) assumes that time preference depends on indi-
vidual past consumption through habit formation, which forms an internal,
rather than external, intertemporal complementarity resulting in multiple
equilibria that arise from the interactions of consumption levels at differ-
ent time periods. Recently, Age´nor (2010) explores the network effects of an
exogenous rise in public infrastructure, which can facilitate, through the rise
in health services and patience, the shift from a low-savings poverty trap to
a steady state characterized by high growth. In the present paper, we point
out instead the endogenous fiscal policy impacts on the optimal dynamic
individual choice, which now depends on current and lagged human capital
formation decisions that can generate multiple BGPs and propagate growth
effects over time.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related lit-
erature and Section 2 sets up and solves the optimization problem of house-
holds and firms, and studies the steady state and the dynamic properties of
the decentralized economy. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the role of Ramsey tax-
ation and growth-maximizing taxation in selecting a second-best allocation.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
Over the last decades, a number of papers have relaxed the assumption of
exogenous time preference. In particular, starting from Uzawa (1968), sev-
eral studies have investigated the effects of individual consumption on the
time preference rate; see Obstfeld (1981, 1990), Mendoza (1991), Shin and
Epstein (1993), Palivos, Wang, and Zhang (1997), Drugeon (1996, 1998,
2000), Uribe (1997), Schmitt-Grohe´ (1998), Stern (2006), Sarkar (2007),
Chen, Hsu, and Lu (2008), and Chakrabarty (2012). In turn, Epstein and
Hynes (1983), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), and Choi, Mark, and Sul
(2008), among others, have endogenized the rate of time preference to
aggregate consumption in variants of general equilibrium models. These
models have highlighted the importance of endogenous time preference for
852 Journal of Public Economic Theory
the dynamic patterns of consumption. Yet, very little is known about the pol-
icy aspects of endogenous time preference to fiscal policy, with the exception
of Age´nor (2010) who assumes that a rise in public health services lowers
impatience.
The main underlying idea in the present paper is that agents are
less impatient in a more educated surrounding environment. This point
goes back to Strotz (1956), who had noticed that discount functions are
formed by teaching and social environments, and was reraised by Becker and
Mulligan (1997), who argued that schooling and other social activities in
“future-oriented capital” focus agents’ attention to the future. Doepke and
Zilibotti (2008) explored the role of parental time invested in patience to
develop a theory of preference formation and explain the historical rever-
sals in economic fortunes. Perhaps the most prominent illustration of the
fiscal policy aspects associated with the effects of education on patience con-
cerns the causes of the high savings rate observed in postwar Japan. Horioka
(1990) and Sheldon (1997, 1998) have attributed this behavior, among other
factors, to an array of public policies implemented through educational pro-
grams that promoted the virtues of patience and thrift.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that education strongly affects
patience by rendering agents less impulsive to choices that tend to over-
weight rewards in close temporal proximity. Fuchs (1982) was the first study
that attempted to investigate empirically the association between time pref-
erence and education, and showed that there is a positive link between
patience and years of schooling. Lawrance (1991) has found that non-
white families without a college education have time preference rates that
are about seven percentage points higher than those of white. Similarly,
Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) have shown on a sample of Danish
households that highly educated adults have subjective discount rates that
are roughly two-thirds compared to those who are less educated. Khwaja,
Silverman, and Sloan (2007) have found that the years of education affect
negatively the degree of impulsivity defined as the measure of an individual’s
ability to set goals and to exercise self-control. Recently, Meier and Sprenger
(2010) and Perez-Arce (2011) report that college education is significantly
associated with time preference and Bauer and Chytilova (2009, 2010) esti-
mate that an additional year of schooling in Ugandan villages lowered signif-
icantly the discount rate.
We close this short review on the endogeneity of time preference by
noting that an indirect channel capturing the impact of human capital on
impatience may stem from income and wealth, which also guarantees a sta-
tionary rate of time preference; see Schumacher (2009), Age´nor (2010), and
Strulik (2012) for recent theoretical contributions that have adopted this
assumption. In empirical studies, Hausman (1979) and Samwick (1998) have
found that discount rates are inversely related to income level, and Horowitz
(1991) and Pender (1996) have reported that discount rates decline with
wealth.
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3. The Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium
3.1. The Basic Model
Consider an economy with a constant number of infinitely lived agents that
consume a single good. We assume that the rate of time preference, ρ, is
not a positive constant, as in standard growth theory, but is endogenously
determined by aggregate consumption, C , and aggregate human capital, H .
Each household seeks to maximize intertemporal discounted utility given by
∫ ∞
0
u(c) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
ρ(Cs ,Hs)ds
]
dt, (1)
with instantaneous utility function of the form u(c) = c1−σ1−σ , where 0 < σ ≤ 1,
subject to the initial asset endowment A(0) > 0 and the income resource
constraint
A˙ = r A + w − c , (2)
where A denotes per capita financial assets, c denotes per capita consump-
tion, and r and w denote the market interest rate and the wage rate,
respectively.3
The time preference function has the following properties:
ASSUMPTION 1: ρ(C,H) ≥ ρˇ > 0.
ASSUMPTION 2: ρ(C,H) = ρ( CH ) with ρ ′(·) ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 shows that the rate of time preference is positive, implying
that there exists a lower bound denoted by ρˇ. By Assumption 2, the rate of
time preference depends positively on the ratio of aggregate consumption to
aggregate human capital. This assumption follows a strand of the literature
that has linked the rate of time preference to social factors taken as external
by agents (Epstein and Hynes 1983, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2003, Choi
et al. 2008, Age´nor 2010, Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis 2010). In particular,
we assume that a higher level of the economy-wide average consumption
raises individual impatience (Epstein and Hynes 1983, Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe 2003, Choi et al. 2008). Intuitively, as the economy gets richer and
consumes more in the aggregate, each individual wanting to “keep up with
the Joneses” becomes more impatient to consume. In addition, we assume
that the higher the human capital stock in the economy, the more patient is
3 Throughout the paper, the time subscript t is omitted for simplicity of notation. Note
that positive felicity is guaranteed only for 0 < σ < 1. We also include here the logarithmic
utility case (σ = 1) to allow for comparisons in our simulations with this extensively used
specification.
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the agent and willing to forego current consumption (Becker and Mulligan
1997). Assumption 2 implies homogeneity of the rate of time preference to
the ratio of consumption to human capital, which is required for the rate of
time preference to be bounded at the steady state (Palivos et al. 1997) and
for the utility function to be consistent with balanced growth (Boyd 1990,
Dolmas 1996).4
In the supply side of the economy, there exists a continuum of perfectly
competitive homogenous firms, normalized to unity, that seek to maximize
profits. Each firm i uses physical capital, Ki , and labor, Li , under the follow-
ing production technology:
Yi = Kai (hLi)1−a, (3)
where 0 < a < 1 denotes the share of physical capital in the production func-
tion, Yi denotes individual output, and h denotes labor productivity. The lat-
ter depends linearly on the average human capital stock and is given by
h = H
L
, (4)
where L denotes the aggregate labor force. Equation (4) is in the spirit of
Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), and captures the idea that knowledge is a
public good that all firms can access at zero cost.5
Following among others Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and Blankenau,
Simpson, and Tomljanovich (2007), we assume that human capital is pro-
vided by the public sector and serves as an input in the production function.
The law of motion for the human capital stock is then given by
H˙ = vIH − δHH, (5)
where IH denotes public expenditures on education, δH denotes the human
capital depreciation rate, and v is a scale parameter capturing the technology
of education. Following Turnovsky (1996, 2000), we assume that the govern-
ment sets its expenditures as a fixed fraction of output and imposes a flat
tax rate on output, τ , to finance spending on human capital according to a
balanced budget policy given by6
IH = τY. (6)
4 Note that although Assumption 2 may imply a causal relation, the dynamics of our gen-
eral equilibrium setup are able to capture the endogeneity between human capital and
time preference. Interestingly, this dynamic feedback propagates a source of multiple
growth equilibria discussed later on.
5 Notice that a richer formulation of labor productivity could allow for an extra parameter
capturing diminishing returns, e.g., in the form of congestion as in Eicher and Turnovsky
(2000) and Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008). This, however, would not affect the main
results derived later on.
6 We do not consider private funding of education as the focus of the paper is on the
effects of fiscal policies on individual time preference through the education channel.
It is also straightforward to show that we could obtain the same results if the flat tax
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Finally, the standard law of motion for the physical capital stock is given by
K˙i = Ii − δKKi , (7)
where Ii denotes investment in physical capital and δK denotes the physical
capital depreciation rate.
3.2. The Reduced Model and Balanced Growth
We can now define the competitive decentralized equilibrium (CDE) of the
economy in order to analyze its properties.
DEFINITION 1: The CDE of the economy is defined for the exogenous policy
instruments τ , factor prices r , w , and aggregate allocations K , H , IH , L, and C,
such that
i) individuals solve their intertemporal utility maximization problem by choosing
c and A, given τ and factor prices;
ii) firms choose Li and Ki in order to maximize their profits, given factor prices
and aggregate allocations;
iii) all markets clear and in the capital market A = KL (per capita assets held by
agents equal capital stock per capita); and
iv) the government budget constraint holds.
The CDE is then defined by (i)–(iii) under the aggregation conditions
∫ 1
0 Ki = K,∫ 1
0 Li = L.
The per capita growth rate of consumption in the CDE is given by
c˙
c
= 1
σ
[r − ρ(·)]. (8)
The first-order conditions of the firms’ profit maximization problem are
given by r = (1 − τ)a( KihLi )a−1 − δk and w = (1 − τ)(1 − a)(
Ki
Li
)ah1−a , and
state that the marginal productivity of capital and labor have to equal
respective factor prices. Using the conditions for homogenous and symmet-
ric firms Li = L and Ki = K , and assuming for the rest of the paper without
loss of generality that δK = δH = δ, the growth rates of aggregate consump-
tion, aggregate physical and human capital stocks are given by the following
equations:
C˙
C
= 1
σ
[
a(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
− ρ(·) − δ
]
, (9)
K˙
K
= (1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
− C
K
− δ, (10)
rate was imposed on labor and capital income because of the Cobb–Douglas production
technology.
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H˙
H
= vτ
(
K
H
)a
− δ. (11)
The transversality condition for this problem is given by
lim
t→∞
K(t)
C(t)σ
exp
{
−
t∫
0
ρ
(
C(s)
H(s)
)
ds
}
= 0. (12)
Equations (9)–(11) summarize the dynamics of our economy. At the
BGP consumption, physical and human capital grow at the same rate, C˙C =
K˙
K = H˙H = gCDE . The BGP of the economy can be derived by defining the
auxiliary stationary variables, ω ≡ CK and z ≡ KH .7 It is straightforward to show
that the dynamics of (9)–(11) are equivalent to the dynamics of the following
system of equations:
ω˙
ω
=
(
a
σ
− 1
)
(1 − τ)za−1 + ω − 1
σ
ρ(zω) −
(
1
σ
− 1
)
δ, (13)
z˙
z
= (1 − τ)za−1 − ω − vτ za . (14)
The following proposition determines the properties (existence and
uniqueness) of the BGP at which ω˙
ω
= z˙z = 0.
PROPOSITION 1 (Properties of BGP): The growth rate of the economy at the
BGP with endogenous time preference to the ratio of aggregate consumption to human
capital, for given parameter values and tax rate, is given by
gCDE = vτ z¯a − δ,
provided that there exists z¯ > 0 : (z¯) = ( a
σ
)(1 − τ)z¯a−1 − vτ z¯a − 1
σ
ρ(z¯ ·
ω¯(z¯)) − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ = 0 and ω¯(z¯) = (1 − τ)z¯a−1 − vτ z¯a > 0, where ω¯ and z¯ are
the steady-state values of ω and z, respectively. We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique well-defined physical to
human capital ratio, which corresponds to a positive growth rate, is ( a
σ
− 1)
(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ < 1
σ
ρˇ.
Case 2: A necessary condition for the existence of two well-defined physical to hu-
man capital ratios, which correspond to two positive growth rates, is ( a
σ
− 1)
(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ ≥ 1
σ
ρˇ. This condition is also sufficient if
ρ
′′
(.) ≤ 0 and − 1
σ
ρ ′(0) > ( aτv
2
1−τ )((
a−1
σ
) − 1).
7 Note that relative to standard endogenous growth models, the time preference function
is an implicit function, which is time varying toward the BGP with a well-defined equi-
librium if it exists; see, e.g., Palivos et al. (1997). For the verification of the transversality
condition in infinite time horizon problems, see Michel (1982).
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
COROLLARY 1 (Ranking of BGPs): In the case of multiplicity with two growth
rates ranked g1 > g2, it follows that ρ1 < ρ2, ω¯1 < ω¯2, z¯1 > z¯2.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 states that when the rate of time preference in the econ-
omy depends on the ratio of aggregate consumption to human capital, there
can be a unique or multiple (two) BGPs. Hence, although the instantaneous
utility and production technology functions satisfy the standard concavity
assumptions, the existence of a unique positive steady-state growth rate is not
guaranteed under the assumption that the aggregate human capital affects
the impatience rate of agents. Corollary 1 shows that in the competitive equi-
librium with high growth, g1, the rate of time preference is lower, ρ1 < ρ2,
consumption to physical capital ratio is lower, ω¯1 < ω¯2, and the physical to
human capital ratio, z¯1, is higher, z¯1 > z¯2.
The central mechanism that drives multiplicity stems from the impacts
of aggregate consumption and aggregate human capital on time preference,
which fuel two counterbalancing channels. Consider the construction of
a BGP through a rise in the tax rate in order to finance human capital
accumulation. This decreases private savings and increases the rate of time
preference in the economy due to the rise in aggregate consumption, thus
lowering growth. A lower growth rate, in turn, lowers the tax base that
finances public investment in human capital leading to even higher time
discounting. On the other hand, by increasing the tax rate, the government
increases the aggregate level of human capital expenditures in the economy.
Thus, the rate of time preference falls, savings propensity increases and the
economy can attain higher growth, which, in turn, increases the tax base and
raises public expenditures on education and growth. In other words, apart
from the standard relation between human capital and growth through the
production function, there is an intertemporal complementarity between
aggregate human capital, time preference, and growth through the Euler
equation (8), setting off a virtuous growth cycle.8
The final outcome will depend on the structural parameters of the
economy. Case 2 of Proposition 1 (multiplicity of BGPs) is more likely to
arise when the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ ,
is sufficiently low and the elasticity of human capital in the production
function is sufficiently high. For instance, assuming a zero depreciation rate
of human capital, it is straightforward to show that when σ < a, the second
channel dominates for any tax rate. This happens because the standard
8 Drugeon (1998) analyzes extensively the theoretical implications of the effects of indi-
vidual and aggregate consumption on time preference.
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dynamic mechanism of intertemporal substitutability between the savings
rate and the rate of return on capital that preserves a unique BGP fails, thus
giving rise to indeterminacy.
3.3. Transitional Dynamics and Stability Analysis
In this subsection, we examine the relation between savings, the return on
physical capital and growth, along with the complementarities of human cap-
ital on intertemporal utility. To this end, we analyze the transitional dynamics
and local stability of the market economy, which are determined by the two-
dimensional system of Equations (13) and (14). In matrix notation, we can
write [
ω˙
z˙
]
= 
[
ω − ω¯
z − z¯
]
,
where  ≡ [ (1 −
ρ ′(·)z¯
σ
)ω¯ [( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)(a − 1)z¯a−2 − 1
σ
ρ ′(·)ω¯]ω¯
−z¯ [(1 − τ)(a − 1)z¯a−1 − vaτ z¯a] ]. After
some algebra, we obtain that the determinant, J , and the trace, 	, of the
above system are given by
J = ω¯z¯
[
− a
σ
(1−τ)(1 − a)z¯a−2 − vaτ z¯a−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−ρ
′(·)z¯a−1
σ
[(1 − τ)a−vτ(1+a)z¯]
]
,
	 = a(1 − τ)z¯a−1 − vτ(1 + a)z¯a − ρ
′(·)ω¯z¯
σ
.
The sign of J is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the econ-
omy and the endogeneity of the rate of time preference. Under a constant
rate of time preference, ρ ′(·) = 0, the standard result of a unique growth rate
and a steady-state ratio of physical to human capital stock that is saddle-path
stable is obtained. However, when the rate of time preference is endogenous,
the local dynamics of the economy are nontrivial.
PROPOSITION 2 (Local Stability): Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any competitive
equilibrium, z¯(·) ≡ z¯(a, τ, v, σ, δ) > 0, is locally stable for any parameter value and
policy instrument in its assumed domain.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
COROLLARY 2 (Type of Stability): Following Proposition 2, the local dynamics
are described as follows:
Case 1 (Saddle-path): If ρ ′(·) < ξ(·), where ξ(·) ≡ ξ(a, τ, v, σ, δ) ≡
a
σ
(1−τ)(1−a)z¯(·)a−2−vaτ z¯(·)a−1
[(1−τ)a−vτ(1+a)z¯(·)] ∈ R is an implicit function of parameters,
then the equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
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Case 2 (Other types of stability): If ρ ′(·) > ξ(·), then the type of stability depends on
γ (·) ≡ γ (a, τ, v, σ, δ) ≡ 	(a, τ, v, σ, δ)2 − 4J (a, τ, v, σ, δ), where
(i) If γ (·) > 0, the equilibrium is a stable node.
(ii) If γ (·) < 0, the equilibrium is a stable focus.
(iii) If γ (·) = 0, all trajectories are closed orbits (center).
In the case of multiple competitive equilibria, there exist set of parameter values
such that case 1 and case 2 hold simultaneously.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Proposition 2 shows that under the assumption of endogenous time
preference of aggregate consumption to human capital ratio, any BGP as
defined in Proposition 1 is locally stable. Corollary 2 to Proposition 2 shows
that global indeterminacy can result to local indeterminacy in the sense that
there can exist a continuum of ways toward a stable equilibrium, which is
locally determinate (saddle-path) if the slope of the impatience function is
sufficiently lower than a threshold level of parameters. Otherwise, the case of
many paths in the neighborhood of a stable competitive equilibrium cannot
be excluded.
The main message of the stability analysis of this section is that multiple
competitive equilibria under endogenous time preference derived in Propo-
sition 1 are stable, and hence both are meaningful. In our framework, time
preference is endogenous to two arguments, aggregate human capital that
provides a source of instability and aggregate consumption that stabilizes
the economy. Intuitively, human capital positively affects the growth rate,
through two complementing channels, namely, the increase in the produc-
tivity of the economy and the increase in patience and savings. Both sources
move in the same direction and generate a dynamic complementarity that
fuels growth. At the same time, consumption externalities affect growth neg-
atively through the Euler equation. When the economy grows during the
transition, the rise in aggregate consumption slows down growth and stabi-
lizes the economy toward the steady-state ratio, z¯, with a constant BGP.
As shown in the proof of Corollary 2, for the same parameter values,
two BGPs can exist: a low one that is saddle-path stable and a high one
that is locally indeterminate (stable node).9 Notably, the type of stability also
depends on the slope of the time preference function, as reflected in cases
1 and 2 of Corollary 2. Case 1 shows that when the slope of time prefer-
ence is relatively low, the type of stability is saddle-path as the dynamics
of our model follow those of the model with exogenous time preference.
A sufficiently high slope of time preference activates the dynamic
9 Notice that our numerical results in subsequent tables rely on stable equilibria.
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complementarities described above and the dynamics toward the steady state
become nontrivial.
4. Time Preference and Ramsey Taxation
In this section, we endogenize fiscal policy and examine the second-best
selection mechanism of the governments’ objective in the context of Ramsey
taxation. In the current setup, there exists a range of the initial endowments
of the aggregate physical and human capital stocks in the CDE under which
the economy will exhibit multiplicity for any tax rate. We examine here if,
and how, the government’s objective can impose restrictions and lead to an
initial endowment allocation that solves the indeterminacy problem.
DEFINITION 2: Ramsey taxation is given under Definition 1 when (i) the govern-
ment chooses the tax rate and aggregate allocations in order to maximize the welfare of
the economy by taking into account the aggregate optimality conditions of the CDE, and
(ii) the government budget constraint and the feasibility and technological conditions
are met.
The government seeks to maximize welfare of the economy subject to
the outcome of the decentralized equilibrium summarized by (9)–(11). The
Hamiltonian of this problem is given by
R = u(C)e− + 1
σ
μ˜CC
[
a(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
− ρ(·) − δ
]
+ μ˜K [(1−τ)Ka (H)1−a −C − δK]+μ˜H [vτKaH 1−a−δH]+μ˜ρ[ρ(·)],
where μ˜C , μ˜K , and μ˜H are the dynamic multipliers associated with (9), (10),
and (11), respectively, and  ≡ ∫ t0 ρ(Cs ,Hs)ds .
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem include the con-
straints (9)–(11) and the optimality conditions with respect to C , H , K , and
τ :
˙˜μC = −[C−σ ]e− −
μ˜C
σ
[
a(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
− ρ(·) − δ
]
+
[
μ˜CC
σ
− μ˜ρ
]
ρ ′(·) 1
H
+ μ˜K , (15)
˙˜μK =
μ˜CC
σ
[
a(1 − a)(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
K−1
]
−μ˜K
[
a(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a−1
− δ
]
− μ˜Hvτa
(
K
H
)a−1
, (16)
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˙˜μH = −
μ˜CC
σ
[
a(1 − a)(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a
K−1 + ρ ′(·) C
H 2
]
,
− μ˜K (1 − a)(1 − τ)
(
K
H
)a
− μ˜H
[
v(1 − a)τ
(
K
H
)a
− δ
]
(17)
+ μ˜ρρ ′(·) CH 2
μ˜CaC
σ
(
K
H
)a−1
+ (μ˜K − vμ˜H )
(
K
H
)a
H = 0, (18)
˙˜μρ =
C1−σ
1 − σ e
−, (19)
C1−σ e− + μ˜C C˙ + μ˜K K˙ + μ˜H H˙ + μ˜ρ[ρ(·)] = 0. (20)
Equations (15)–(19), the optimality condition for the Hamiltonian
lim
t→∞ 
R = 0 as given by (20), and Equations (9)–(11) characterize the
solution of the Ramsey problem. As the system of equations is analytically
intractable, we focus our analysis on the tax rate and growth rate at the
steady state, as in Chamley (1986) and other related papers. Notice that,
according to Definition 2, the Ramsey problem is a Stackelberg equilibrium
in which the government announces the tax schedule through a commit-
ment technology, and then the households reacts. Hence, the government
chooses among the competitive equilibria to maximize welfare using dis-
tortionary taxation and, given Proposition 2, the competitive equilibrium
chosen is locally stable for any tax schedule.
After some algebra, the long-run allocation of the Ramsey environment
is characterized by the following system of equations:
τ˜ = (1 − a) − ρ(ω˜z˜)z˜
−a
v
, (21)
(
a
σ
− 1
)
(1 − τ˜)z˜a−1 + ω˜ − 1
σ
ρ(ω˜z˜) −
(
1
σ
− 1
)
δ = 0, (22)
(1 − τ˜)z˜a−1 − ω˜ − vτ˜ z˜a = 0. (23)
The system of Equations (21)–(23) yields the Ramsey tax rate, τ˜ , and ω˜ and
z˜ as functions of the parameters, provided that the tax rate determined by
(21) is feasible. The following numerical example illustrates the outcome of
the economy under the Ramsey allocation.10
10 Example 1 uses a linear time preference function for computational tractability. A con-
cave function would also satisfy our assumptions. In the online Companion Appendix to
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EXAMPLE 1: Consider a linear time preference function, ρ( CH ) = b ∗ ( CH ) + ρˇ,
that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 with parameter values a = 0.35, δ = 0.01,
b = 0.5, ρˇ = 0.005, v = 0.1, and σ = 0.2. Under the Ramsey allocation, we find a
unique second-best allocation with the growth rate given by gR = 0.1 corresponding to
a tax rate given by τ˜ = 0.597.
Example 1 shows that for parameter values under which the competitive
equilibrium exhibits multiple BGPs, the government attains a unique BGP
by implementing the appropriate allocation and restrictions in the Ramsey
environment. Intuitively, this happens because the government uses the allo-
cation of aggregate endowments and an associated tax rate to select a stable
second-best regime and attain welfare maximization. Formally, this is accom-
plished through the state-dependent taxation rule, given by Equation (21).
Concerning standard literature, global and local indeterminacy at the
CDE implies that the rational expectations equilibria involve random vari-
ables, which are unrelated to the economy’s fundamentals and are driven by
individual beliefs (Benhabib and Farmer 1994, Benhabib and Perli 1994).
In the current setup, the government selects a second-best regime through
the endogenous allocation of endowments and the choice of a feasible tax
rate in a dynamic environment. This selection is feasible since intertemporal
complementarities, which fuel multiplicity and are external to the agents in
the CDE, are internalized under Ramsey taxation. Hence, the government
obtains information through the agents’ reaction function and consequently
imposes restrictions on the tax rate and endowment allocation through
commitment in order to drive the CDE to a unique second-best allocation.
5. Growth-Maximizing Fiscal Policy and Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze growth-maximizing fiscal policy rules. Modern
growth theory has shown particular interest in growth-enhancing policies,
as the understanding of the forces of economic growth is crucial in order
to identify the relative merits and synergies of government interventions.
Moreover, the growth rate is usually the main measurable objective of the
government. Although earlier papers, like Barro (1990), have mostly con-
sidered welfare and growth-maximizing policies under a unified perspective,
subsequent studies have emphasized the role of growth maximization as an
independent policy target.11
the paper, we derive the detailed system of equations under Ramsey taxation and we ana-
lyze the properties of the second-best allocation. We also report a detailed set of additional
numerical results.
11 See Economides, Park, and Philippopoulos (2007) and Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis
(2010) for a similar approach.
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DEFINITION 3: A growth-maximizing (GM) allocation is given under Definition
1 when (i) the government chooses the tax rate and aggregate allocations in order to
maximize the growth rate of the economy by taking into account the aggregate optimality
conditions of the CDE, and (ii) the government budget constraint and the feasibility
and technological conditions are met.
The government seeks to maximize the growth rate of the economy, g ,
given by
max
z,τ
g = vτ za − δ
subject to the CDE response summarized by ( a
σ
)(1 − τ)za−1 − vτ za −
1
σ
ρ(ω(z)z) − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ = 0 and ω(z) = (1 − τ)za−1 − vτ za .
The first-order conditions with respect to z and τ are
av τˆ zˆa−1 +
(
a
σ
)
(a − 1)λˆ(1 − τˆ)zˆa−2 − λˆvτˆazˆa−1
− 1
σ
λˆ[a(1 − τˆ)zˆa−1 − v(a + 1)τˆ zˆa]ρ ′(·) = 0, (24)
vzˆa −
(
a
σ
)
λˆzˆa−1 − vλˆzˆa + 1
σ
λˆ[zˆa + vzˆa+1]ρ ′(·) = 0, (25)
where λˆ is the associated Lagrange multiplier, and zˆ and τˆ are the GM values
of z and τ , respectively. Solving (25) for λˆ and substituting in (24), we can
obtain the following system of equations that characterize the GM policy
rules:
τˆ = a(1 − a + ρ
′(·)zˆ)
a + vρ ′(·)zˆ2 > 0, (26)
(
a
σ
)
(1 − τˆ)zˆa−1 − vτˆ zˆa − 1
σ
ρ(ω(zˆ)zˆ) −
(
1
σ
− 1
)
δ = 0. (27)
Equation (26) yields the GM tax rate, τˆ . Since the problem is a static
one, the dynamics of the economy follow those of the competitive equilib-
rium and are locally stable. Notice that when the rate of time preference is
constant
(
ρ ′(·) = 0), the government has to implement a marginal tax rate
that is equal to the elasticity of publicly provided human capital in the pro-
duction function, τ = (1 − a), as in Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993),
and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). However, under endogenous time pref-
erence
(
ρ ′(·) = 0), the GM tax rate can be lower or higher than the elas-
ticity of human capital in the production function since the tax policy also
depends on demand-driven parameters.
To highlight these points, we provide some numerical examples for a
range of parameter values to check the selection of the GM allocation and
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Table 1: Changes in b and GM allocation
b gGM τˆ zˆ ωˆ CˆH ρˆ
Multiplicity in CDE (σ = 0.2)
0.1 0.102 0.569 6.859 0.011 0.077 0.01270
0.4 0.106 0.641 5.479 0.002 0.013 0.01029
0.7 0.107 0.645 5.426 0.001 0.007 0.00996
Uniqueness in CDE (σ = 1)
0.1 0.062 0.727 0.973 0.205 0.199 0.024
0.4 0.051 0.809 0.445 0.260 0.116 0.051
0.7 0.045 0.843 0.297 0.288 0.085 0.065
Notes: a = 0.35, δ = 0.01, v = 0.1, ρˇ = 0.005, b = 0.5.
how the comparative statics evolve. For comparison purposes, we illustrate
below these analytical results using the parameter values of Example 1 for
which the CDE exhibits multiplicity.
EXAMPLE 2: Consider a linear time preference function, ρ( CH ) = b ∗ ( CH ) + ρˇ,
that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 with parameter values a = 0.35, δ = 0.01,
b = 0.5, ρˇ = 0.005, v = 0.1, and σ = 0.2. The GM tax rate is given by τˆ = 0.64
with respective growth rate gGM = 0.11, physical to human capital ratio zˆ = 5.45,
rate of time preference ρˆ = 0.01, consumption to physical capital ratio ωˆ = 0.02 and
consumption to human capital ratio CˆH = 0.10.
Example 2 shows that under the parameter values that produce mul-
tiplicity in the CDE, the GM allocation can act as a selection device and
impose the allocation restrictions and the tax rate that guarantee a unique
BGP. Notice that in the GM allocation, the “high-growth” BGP is selected, a
result that is consistent with the government’s objective.12
The slope of impatience function, b , is crucial in terms of the qualitative
response of the economy. Table 1 shows the response of the economy to
changes in b . The upper panel of Table 1 indicates that if we set parameter
values where the CDE is characterized by multiple BGPs, the selection of
the GM allocation is not affected by changes in b . In turn, the lower panel
of Table 1 checks the response of the Barro (1990) taxation rule to changes
in b and, in conjunction with the upper panel, provides a picture of the
response of the endogenous allocation of the GM allocation problem to
changes in the slope of impatience function. In particular, an increase in
b leads to an increase in the tax rate and to a decrease in the physical to
human capital stock ratio, whereas the effects on the rate of time preference
12 For the parameter values used in Example 4 and the growth maximizing tax rate τˆ =
0.643, the CDE gives two equilibrium growth rates g¯1 = 0.046 and g¯2 = 0.106.
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Table 2: Changes in σ and b and summarized GM allocation responses
gGM τˆ zˆ ωˆ CˆH ρˆ
increase in σ for low σ (+) (+) (−) (−) (−) (−)
increase in σ for high σ (−) (−) (−) (+) (+) (+)
increase in b for σ = 0.2 (+) (+) (−) (−) (−) (−)
increase in b for σ = 1 (−) (+) (−) (+) (−) (+)
and the growth rate are ambiguous and depend on the level of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. Intuitively, an increase in the slope of the
impatience function increases ceteris paribus the rate of time preference,
which lowers savings and capital accumulation and, in turn, decreases the
physical to human capital ratio. Also, by the Euler equation, an increase in
the rate of time preference lowers the growth rate and the tax base of the
economy, and generates an endogenous increase in the tax rate to finance
public expenditures at the BGP. In turn, the endogenous increase in the
tax rate activates the previously analyzed mechanism. For a sufficiently high
level of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (e.g., σ = 1), the rise in
the tax rate increases consumption more than human capital expenditures
and reinforces the initial increase in the rate of time preference leading to
an additional decrease in the growth rate of the economy. In contrast, when
σ is sufficiently low (e.g., σ = 0.2), an increase in the tax rate increases
human capital expenditures leading to an increase in the growth rate of
the economy that counteracts the initial decrease. Also, in the latter case,
the increase in the tax rate lowers the consumption to human capital ratio,
since human capital expenditures increase more than consumption for low
σ , leading to lower rate of time preference and counteracting the first-order
increase. As summarized in Table 2, for low values of σ , the response of
the rate of time preference to the decrease in the consumption to human
capital ratio, CH , is high and dominates the initial exogenous increase of the
rate of time preference caused by b , whereas for high values of σ , the initial
increase in ρ dominates its endogenous decrease driven by CH .
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper studied the macroeconomic implications of the endogeneity of
time preference to aggregate human capital provided by the public sector.
We derived the long-run behavior of the economy and analyzed the impact
of fiscal policy. The main findings are that multiple BGPs emerge in the dec-
entralized economy and that second-best (Ramsey and growth-maximizing)
taxation can act as a selection device in order to lead the economy to a
desired BGP.
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An equivalent way to analyze the impacts of public policy on individual
patience and, in turn, on incentives to save would be through expenditures
on public health. As discussed in Age´nor (2010), healthier individuals are
less myopic and tend to value the future more, an effect that works through
the standard “life expectancy” channel emphasized in OLG models with
endogenous lifetimes or mortality rates (Blanchard 1985). Our analytical
results offer some novel policy implications for economic performance as
it is argued that active public policies in sectors like education and health
are crucial in boosting growth, particularly in countries that face develop-
ment traps. Given that countries with similar structural characteristics often
seem to display divergent economic behavior, our findings suggest an addi-
tional generating mechanism of “low-growth” in the long run. This stems
from the linkage between endogenous time discounting and productive fis-
cal policy, with the latter now operating through the demand, rather than the
supply, side of the economy by forming the patience of consumers. In turn,
our results on the role of second-best fiscal policy in driving the economy
to a “high-growth” path, albeit highly stylized, indicate the importance of
active policymaking in determining the long-run performance of the econ-
omy through individual patience by enhancing education, health, or other
“future-oriented” policies.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
The method will be to separate function (z) in two functions and find
their intersection to solve it. We define (z) ≡ ( a
σ
)(1 − τ)(z)a−1 − v(z)aτ −
( 1
σ
− 1)δ and (z) ≡ 1
σ
ρ(z · ω(z)). Both (z) and (z) are continuous in z.
In order for ω(z) > 0 to hold, we must have z < 1−τvτ .
Equation (z) has the following properties:
(1) lim
z→0
(z) = +∞, lim
z→ 1−τvτ
(z) = ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ.
(2) ∂(z)
∂z < 0,
∂2(z)
∂z2 > 0.
From the properties of (z), it follows that it is a strictly decreasing and
convex function in its domain, starts from +∞, and ends at ( a
σ
− 1)(1 −
τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ.
Equation (z) has the following properties:
(1) lim
z→0
(z) = 1
σ
ρ(0) = 1
σ
ρˇ, lim
z→ 1−τ
τ
(z) = 1
σ
ρ(0) = 1
σ
ρˇ.
(2) ∂(z)
∂z = 1σ ρ ′(.)[a(1 − τ)za−1 − vτ(1 + a)za]. We have ∂(z)∂z > 0 for
a(1 − τ)za−1 − v(1 + a)τ za > 0 ⇒ z < a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ and ∂(z)∂z < 0 for z >
a(1−τ)
v(1+a)τ . Thus, (z) has a maximum at z = a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ .
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From the properties of (z), it follows that it is an inverse U-shaped
curve starting from 1
σ
ρˇ and ending at 1
σ
ρˇ.
Assuming equilibrium existence, from the properties of (z) and (z),
it follows that there exist one or two positive balanced growth rates. For
low values of z, since +∞ > 1
σ
ρˇ, we get that (z) lies above (z). Also,
for the upper bound value of z, (z) = ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
−
1)δ and (z) = 1
σ
ρˇ. Since both functions are continuous, if ( a
σ
− 1)(1 −
τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ < 1
σ
ρˇ, which means that (z) starts above and ends
below (z), implying that (z) will cross (z) once and there will exist a
unique balanced growth rate. Thus, ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ <
1
σ
ρˇ is a sufficient parametric condition for a unique balanced growth rate.
If ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ ≥ 1
σ
ρˇ, then there can exist two
balanced growth rates because (z) is an inverse U-shaped curve, while (z)
strictly monotone and decreasing, so (z) can cross (z) at most two times.
Thus, ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ ≥ 1
σ
ρˇ is a necessary parametric
condition for multiplicity.
In order for this condition to be sufficient, we need to find the para-
metric condition under which (z) cannot be tangent to (z). If they are
tangent, since (z) is always decreasing, this has to be at the region where
(z) is decreasing, i.e., z > a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ . In other words, we need to prove that
there cannot be an intersection of the first derivatives of (z) and (z),
∂(z)
∂z = ∂(z)∂z , for z > a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ .
Equation ∂(z)
∂z has the following properties: limz→ a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ
∂(z)
∂z = 0,
limz→ 1−τvτ
∂(z)
∂z = − τσ ρ ′(0)(1−τvτ )a , ∂
2(z)
∂z2 = 1σ ρ
′′
(.)[a(1−τ)za−1−vτ(1+
a)za]2 + 1
σ
ρ
′
(.)[a(a − 1)(1 − τ)za−2 − vτa(1 + a)za−1] < 0 for ρ ′′(.) ≤ 0.
Thus, for ρ
′′
(.) ≤ 0, ∂(z)
∂z is a monotonically decreasing function starting
from 0 and ending at − τ
σ
ρ ′(0)(1−τvτ )
a .
Equation ∂(z)
∂z has the following properties: limz→ a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ
∂(z)
∂z =
τ( a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ )
a−1v[(a − 1)( (1+a)
σ
) − a], limz→ 1−τvτ
∂(z)
∂z = aτ(1−τvτ )a−1v[( a−1σ ) −
1], ∂
2(z)
∂z2 = a(a − 1)za−2[( a−2σ )(1−τz ) − τ] > 0. Thus, ∂(z)∂z is an increasing
function starting from τ( a(1−τ)(1+a)τ )
a−1v[(a − 1)(1+a
σ
) − a] and ending at
aτ(1−τvτ )
a−1v[( a−1
σ
) − 1].
Then, since ∂(z)
∂z starts above
∂(z)
∂z , limz→ a(1−τ)(1+a)τ
∂(z)
∂z > limz→ a(1−τ)(1+a)τ
∂(z)
∂z ,
and both functions are monotone, then a sufficient condition for non-
intersection is that ∂(z)
∂z ends above
∂(z)
∂z , that is, limz→ 1−τvτ
∂(z)
∂z >
limz→ 1−τvτ
∂(z)
∂z . This happens if − τσ ρ ′(0)(1−τvτ )a > aτ(1−τvτ )a−1v( a−1σ − 1)
⇒ − 1
σ
ρ ′(0) > ( vaτ1−τ )v(
a−1
σ
− 1). Thus, if ρ ′′(.) ≤ 0 and − 1
σ
ρ ′(0) >
( aτv
2
1−τ )(
a−1
σ
− 1), condition ( a
σ
− 1)(1 − τ)aτ 1−av1−a − ( 1
σ
− 1)δ ≥ 1
σ
ρˇ is
sufficient for the presence of two positive balanced growth rates. (Figure A1
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Figure A1: Uniqueness and multiplicity of equibrium. Notes: (1) Parameter values:
a = 0.35, δ = 0.01, v = 0.1, ρ = 0.005 , b = 2, and τ = 0.6.
(2) The solid lines correspond to σ = 0.2 where multiple balanced growth rates
exist (E1 and E2). The dashed lines correspond to σ = 0.8 where there exists a
unique equilibrium (E′).
depicts two examples with parametric values that correspond to uniqueness
or multiplicity and the corresponding shapes of (z) and (z).) 
According to Proposition 1, in the case of multiple balanced growth rates
(z) and (z) intersect twice, for z¯1 and z¯2. Let those two balanced growth
rates ranked as z¯1 > z¯2. To find the corresponding ranking of ω¯1 and ω¯2, we
solve (14) for ω¯ in the steady state, and we take the derivative with respect
to z, ∂ω¯
∂z = (a − 1)(1 − τ)z¯a−2 − avτ z¯a−1 < 0. Thus, ω¯ is a strictly decreasing
function of z¯, so z¯1 > z¯2 ⇒ ω¯1 < ω¯2. To find the ranking of g1 and g2, we
take the derivative of g with respect to z, ∂g
∂z = vτaz¯a−1 > 0. Thus, g is an
increasing function of z, so z¯1 > z¯2 ⇒ g1 > g2. The ranking for the rate of
time preference, ρ(z¯ · ω(z¯)) = σ(z¯), which is a nonmonotonic function of
z , comes from the analysis above. As (z) lies above (z) and is mono-
tonically decreasing, it cannot cross twice (z) in its increasing part. Then,
z¯1 > z¯2 ⇒ (z¯1) < (z¯2) ⇒ σ(z¯1) < σ(z¯2) ⇒ ρ1 < ρ2. So, in case of two
balanced growth rates with high growth, g1, and low growth, g2, the endoge-
nous variables are ranked as ρ1 < ρ2, ω¯1 < ω¯2, z1 > z2. 
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 2
The method will be to evaluate the determinant and the trace of the lin-
earized dynamical system. We will consider a well-defined steady state, i.e.,
ω¯ > 0, z¯ > 0, as the one considered in Proposition 1. Given the implicit
functions for the rate of time preference and the nonlinear system of
equations for the determination of the steady state, our endogenous vari-
ables, z¯(a, τ, v, σ, δ), ω¯(a, τ, v, σ, δ), are treated as functions of the economy
parameters.
Then, for ω¯(·) > 0 and z¯(·) > 0, the first two arguments inside the
parenthesis of the determinant of the matrix are always negative for the
assumed values of the parameters and policy instruments (recall a ∈ (0, 1)
and τ ∈ (0, 1)). But regarding the third part, although ρ ′(·)z¯a−1
σ
> 0, the sign
of [(1 − τ)a − vτ(1 + a)z¯] depends on the value of the parameters . Then,
for parameter values that the steady state, z¯ l(·), is lower than a parametric
threshold z¯T ≡ a(1−τ)v(1+a)τ , then − ρ
′(·)z¯a−1
σ
[(1 − τ)a − vτ(1 + a)z¯] < 0. Thus, for
parameter values where z¯ l(·) < z¯T , the determinant of the matrix is neg-
ative, and, in turn, the balanced growth rate of the economy is stable.
Then, we need to show what happens for parameter values that result
to steady-state value, z¯, above the threshold, z¯ h(·) > z¯T . In this case, the
determinant of the matrix can be positive, so we need to consider the
trace. In particular, if the determinant of the matrix is positive, then we
need to show that the trace is negative to prove stability for z¯ h(·) > z¯T .
The trace is (1 − ρ ′(·)z¯
σ
)ω¯ + [(1 − τ)(a − 1)z¯a−1 − vaτ z¯a], where from (14)
in the steady state, we substitute for ω¯ = (1 − τ)za−1 − vτ za , and after some
algebra, we obtain: tr ace = a(1 − τ)z¯a−1 − vτ(1 + a)z¯a− ρ ′(·)ω¯z¯
σ
. The sign
of the third part is negative, (− ρ ′(·)ω¯z¯
σ
< 0 as ρ ′(·) > 0 by Assumption 2)
and a(1 − τ)z¯a−1 − vτ(1 + a)z¯a depends on the value of z¯. For z¯ h(·) > z¯T ≡
a(1−τ)
v(1+a)τ , the trace is negative. Thus, the steady state is stable.
To sum up, for 0 < z¯(·) < z¯T , the determinant is positive and the steady
state is stable (in particular, saddle path). For, z¯(·) > z¯T , the steady state
can be either saddle-path stable (negative determinant) or stable (negative
trace) with indeterminate type of stability that will be analyzed later on. Thus,
for any parameter value in the assumed domain, and Assumptions 1 and 2, a
well-defined steady state, ω¯(·) > 0, z¯(·) > 0, will be always stable. 
Proof of Corollary 1 that analyzes the type of stability comes straight-
forward from the analysis of the Jacobian and the discriminant of the
characteristic equation of , γ , and the theorems of two-dimensional
dynamical systems in continuous time. To show that there exists a set of
parameters that case 1 and case 2 hold simultaneously, we consider a linear
time preference function, ρ( CH ) = b ∗ ( CH ) + ρˇ, that satisfies Assumptions 1
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and 2 with parameter values a = 0.35, δ = 0.01, b = 0.5, ρˇ = 0.005, v = 0.1,
τ = 0.4, and σ = 0.2. There are ratios of physical to human capital, a low
one, z¯1 = 0.6789 that corresponds to a high consumption to physical capital
ratio, ω¯1 = 0.7367, relatively high rate of time preference, ρ¯1 = 0.255, and
relatively low growth, gCDE1 = 0.025, and a high one, z¯2 = 14.94, which
corresponds to a low consumption to physical capital ratio, ω¯2 = 0.0003,
relatively low rate of time preference, ρ¯2 = 0.007, and relatively high growth,
gCDE2 = 0.093. In the low balanced growth rate, the determinant of  is
negative, J = −0.93, and the low balanced growth rate displays saddle-path
stability (ρ ′(·) = 0.5 < ξ1 = 7.35) and case 1 holds. In the high balanced
growth rate, the determinant is positive, J = 0.00127, the trace is negative,
	 = −0.1158 and the type of stability is a node as, γ = 0.0083 > 0 and case
2 holds (ρ ′(·) = 0.5 > ξ2 = −0.09). 
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